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1. Introduction
Pensions are the single largest government transfer program in the European Union. In
2001, the then 15 EU member states spent on average 8.8 percent of their GDP on pub-
lic retirement bene…ts (OECD, 2003). Pension policies have traditionally been viewed as
a domain of nation-states and, correspondingly, there are wide di¤erences in how bene-
…ts are determined. In Continental Europe, like France, Germany, and Italy, pensions are
viewed as postponed wage income and their aim is to smooth lifetime consumption. In
such “Bismarckian”programs, retirement bene…ts are linked to past earnings. In the com-
peting “Beveridgean”tradition, retirement bene…ts are used to protect the elderly against
poverty. Bene…ts are then rather ‡at, with the link to past earnings weak or even non-
existent. These rather ‡at-rate systems dominate, or at least play an important part, in
public pensions in Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (Disney,
2004). Both earnings-related and ‡at-rate pensions are mainly organized according to pay-
as-you-go (PAYG) principle, implying that the bene…ts of the current retirees are paid by
current workers.1
Migration may endanger both earnings-related and ‡at-rate pension systems. With mi-
gration, intragenerational redistribution of ‡at-rate systems generates an adverse selection
problem. Earnings-related systems, on the other hand, may bene…t from the in‡ow of high-
income contributors. The intergenerational redistribution component, on the other hand,
poses a more severe challenge to earnings-related systems as these are larger.2 In 2001, pub-
lic spending on retirement bene…ts was on average 6.4 percent of GDP in OECD countries
with ‡at-rate bene…ts, and 9.4 percent in countries with earnings-related bene…ts (Disney,
2004; OECD, 2003).
Social security rules and migration possibilities also in‡uence incentives to invest in hu-
man capital. An option to migrate to a country with less redistributive social security
system increases the expected private return to human capital, thus boosting such invest-
ments. When young people do not know beforehand how mobile they are going to be, the
investments of those who …nally remain change. Such uncertainty about one’s own future
mobility may result from uncertainties related to family formation, future partnership status,
and on random events related to employment.
This paper takes a dynamic view of economic integration and the challenges it poses
to social security systems of di¤erent types. There are two countries, one with earnings-
related bene…ts, and another with ‡at-rate bene…ts. The two countries may di¤er also in
social security contribution rates, and both have organized their social security system on
a PAYG-basis. At the starting point, there is no migration. Then labor becomes mobile,
corresponding to tighter integration. Since production technologies are identical in both
countries, migration does not a¤ect the productivity of human capital stock of the migrant.
This paper asks two questions. The …rst one is how the possibility of migration a¤ects
1Some countries, like the Netherlands, also have a prominent funded part of social security. This paper
focuses on PAYG systems.
2The average rate of return o¤ered by the PAYG system equals only the growth rate of the economy,
which always falls short of the market interest rate (Aaron 1966). The lower rate of return that the PAYG
systems o¤er can be interpreted as an interest payment on the implicit debt, which was created when older
cohorts were paid pensions, even when they had not previously contributed to the system.
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incentives to invest in human capital and economic well-being in the two countries. The
second question is whether both social security systems can be maintained after the labor
markets have been integrated.
The main …ndings are the following. Assume …rst that neither country has a social
security system that would be preferred by all citizens. Then allowing for migration would
increase the investment in human capital at the upper echelon of productivity distribution
in the country with ‡at-rate bene…ts, and decrease investment in human capital at the lower
levels of productivity in the country with earnings-related bene…ts. Thus, allowing migration
would increase human capital formation in the country with ‡at-rate bene…ts, and reduce
human capital formation in the country with earnings-related bene…ts. The e¤ects on the
stock of human capital in both countries after migration would depend on the productivity
distribution, and on the social security contribution rates.
Assume next that the two countries have the same social security contribution rate, and
that all citizens have the same innate ability. Then allowing for migration poses a challenge
only to the country with ‡at-rate bene…ts. This country would lose workers immediately after
allowing for migration, at the same time as it would still face obligations towards its elderly
bene…ciaries. The most striking …nding is that this need not pose a problem in the dynamic
context, provided that there are transfers between the two countries. In such coordinated
solution, the citizens belonging to each cohort of both countries would be strictly better o¤,
provided that there is initially a transfer from the country with earnings-related bene…ts to
the country with ‡at-rate bene…ts, and in subsequent periods a transfer from the country
with ‡at-rate bene…ts to the country with earnings-related bene…ts.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 develops the
model. Section 4 presents the results concerning investment in human capital and migration.
Section 5 analyzes welfare e¤ects. Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature Review
European social insurance and public pension systems create considerable incentives to
migrate. Wildasin (1999) uses data on public pension contributions and bene…ts to estimate
the change in the present value of lifetime wealth for “representative workers”in seven EU
countries, …nding that migrants may experience changes in public pension wealth, up to
25 percent of lifetime wealth. Homburg and Richter (1993) and Breyer and Kolmar (2002)
analyze the e¢ciency of national ‡at-rate pension systems when labor is mobile. The e¤ects
of migration on competition between Bismarckian and Beveridgean social insurance systems
has been analyzed by Cremer and Pestieau (2003). They focus on intragenerational redistrib-
ution, instead of pensions. Most closely related to this paper, Kolmar (forthcoming) analyzes
migration between two countries, one with a ‡at-rate and another with an earnings-related
system. In his contribution, each country contains high-skilled and low-skilled individuals.
The size of these two groups and their wages grow at exogenous country-speci…c rates. All
of these earlier contributions take productivity as given, while this paper endogenizes it.
The e¤ects of social security incentives on human capital investment have received sur-
prisingly little attention. Lau and Poutvaara (2001) present a theoretical model of the e¤ects
of social security incentives on human capital investment, in the absence of migration and
with a zero interest rate. Jensen et al. (2004) present a computational general equilibrium
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model of human capital formation, labor supply and retirement, under alternative social
security rules. They …nd that social security rules have a considerable impact on retirement
behavior and welfare. Even low-productivity workers would prefer earnings-related bene…ts,
if productivity di¤erences are su¢ciently low. Neither Lau and Poutvaara (2001) nor Jensen
et al. (2004) include mobility.
There is an extensive literature on the e¤ects of the mobility of labor on investment in
education. Justman and Thisse (1997) and Wildasin (2000) analyze the e¤ects of migration
on public provision of education. Analyzing migration from poor to rich countries, Grubel
and Scott (1966) and Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) highlight the losses that emigration
imposes on source countries. Contrary to their results, Mountford (1997) and Stark et al.
(1997) show that some migration from developing countries to developed countries may
actually bene…t the country of origin. A possibility to migrate to a richer country increases
the expected return to human capital investment in a poor country, thus encouraging private
investment. Even with part of high-skilled workers migrating, this initial brain gain may
dominate, so that the less developed country can end up with a higher average level of
human capital per worker with migration than without it. Mountford (1997) and Stark et
al. (1997) study the use of migration quotas by less developed countries. This paper assumes
that there are no legal restrictions to migration, consistent with the EU principles of free
mobility. Furthermore, this paper allows migration in both directions. None of these earlier
contributions include social security.
3. The Model
Two countries, labelled A and B, form a common labor market at the beginning of period
1. Both countries are populated by overlapping generations of citizens. Each citizen lives for
two periods, becoming educated, possibly migrating and working in the …rst period and being
retired and collecting social security bene…ts in the second period. Citizens become educated
in their country of birth at the beginning of the …rst period of their life. They learn whether
they are mobile or not after completing education. That the actual realization of mobility
is disclosed only after completing education may re‡ect, for example, realized language and
cultural skills, social networks, and family formation. The probability of being mobile is ?,
and those mobile can migrate costlessly. Any shocks to the value of ? are revealed at the
beginning of the period, before investments in education are made. The next section solves
how changes in ? a¤ect investment in education in the two countries. After that, welfare
e¤ects of changes are analyzed focusing on the e¤ects of the formation of the common labor
market when initially ? = 0, and as a result of the shock ? becomes positive. This is without
loss of generality. All results would hold qualitatively for a discrete increase in ? also in case
? is initially positive.
The two countries di¤er in their social security system. In country A, the social security
system is earnings-related. Workers pay in every period ? social security contributions at
rate ??, and receive in the following period as social security bene…ts a fraction ??+1 of their
previous earnings. This fraction is determined endogenously to balance the government
budget. In country B, the social security contribution rate is ?? and social security bene…ts
to the elderly are ‡at-rate, and of size ?? in period ?. All workers receive pension bene…ts
from the country where they worked. This implies that the results would hold whether the
3
retired stay in the country where they worked, or return to their home country. In both
countries, the social security system is organized on a PAYG basis.
Citizens may di¤er in their productivity. Human capital is a joint product of innate
ability and education. For a citizen with ability ? and individual e¤ort ?? in period ?, the
individual human capital stock is
?(?? ??) = ?+ ??? (1)
The monetarized cost of e¤ort ?? is 12?
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? , which may include both psychological disutility
and private resource costs for tuition and books. This formulation of an increasing marginal
cost guarantees a bounded investment in ?. Ability ? follows the same distribution in both
member states. The innate ability is distributed between zero and ?, with density function
? (?). The utility of the educated is in both periods linear in their consumption, net of the
cost of investment in education. The individuals have access to perfect capital markets at the
internationally determined interest rate ?, corresponding also to the individual discount rate.
The pre-migration younger population to become educated is of the same size in A and B,
and normalized to one. Production technologies are identical in both countries, combining
capital and labor with constant elasticies to scale. The wage rate is normalized to unity
re‡ecting the fact that the wage rate is …xed in a small open economy by the international
mobility of physical capital.
Importantly, pre-migration cohort sizes remain the same in each country even with mi-
gration. One interpretation of this is that migration is concentrated among those citizens
without children. If this is the case, then those who become mobile would be a subset of
citizens without children. Pre-migration cohorts of both countries could still remain con-
stant. Alternatively, we could think that migration is only temporary, and that citizens then
receive pension bene…ts from both countries in relation to how long they have worked in each
country. In that case, they would return to their home country before their children invest
in their education. Either interpretation would result in qualitatively similar results. The
remainder of the paper is written under the implicit assumption that migrants are a subset
of those citizens without children, but all the results would hold also if migration would be
temporary and citizens would then receive pension bene…ts from both countries in relation
to how long they have spent in each country.
4. Social Security and Investment in Education
4.1 No migration
In country A, a citizen with ability ? chooses private investment in e¤ort to maximize
his or her lifetime disposable income, solving
max
??
µ
¡1
2
?2? + (1¡ ??)(?+ ??) +
???+1(?+ ??)
1 + ?
¶
? (2)
Here ???+1 denotes the expected replacement rate in the following period. This results in
private investment in e¤ort
???? = 1¡ ?? + ?
?
?+1
1 + ?
?
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In a steady-state equilibrium, ???+1 = ?? and also ???? is constant and independent of
ability. In period ?, the budget balance of the social security system then reads as
??
Z ?
0
(?+ ????) ?(?)?? = ??
Z ?
0
(?+ ????¡1) ?(?)???
The left-hand side reports social security contributions and the right-hand side bene…ts, as
a function of past earnings. Given that ???? = ????¡1 with constant ?? and ???+1 = ??, the
social security budget is balanced only when ?? = ??. The equilibrium private investment
in education is then
???? = 1¡ ???
1 + ?
? (3)
Correspondingly, private investment in education in country B solves
max
??
µ
¡1
2
?2? + (1¡ ??)(?+ ??) +
???+1
1 + ?
¶
? (4)
resulting in private investment in e¤ort
???? = 1¡ ?? ? (5)
Note that as country B has lump-sum bene…ts, only the social security contribution rate but
not the lump-sum bene…t a¤ects investment in education. The government budget constraint
yields in the steady-state without migration
?? = ??
Z ?
0
(?+ 1¡ ??) ?(?)???
4.2 Common labor market
The timing of individual actions except for saving and consumption in a common labor
market is presented as Fig. 1. Individual decisions are characterized backwards. That
is, migration decisions are …rst presented for arbitrary investments in education, and the
optimal investments in education are then studied taking subsequent migration decisions as
given.
After learning their mobility status, mobile citizens choose the member state to maximize
the net present value of their remaining lifetime disposable income. Given perfect capital
markets, this also maximizes their utility. A mobile citizen migrates from member state A
to B if and only if
(1¡ ??)(?+ ??) + ?
?
?+1
1 + ?
? (1¡ ?? + ?
?
?+1
1 + ?
)(?+ ??)? (6)
Correspondingly, a mobile citizen migrates from member state B to A if and only if
(1¡ ?? + ?
?
?+1
1 + ?
)(?+ ??) ? (1¡ ??)(?+ ??) + ?
?
?+1
1 + ?
? (7)
When deciding on their investment in education, citizens form expectations on whether they
would like to migrate, in case they become mobile. For example, a citizen with low ability
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Figure 1: Timing with mobility.
may always prefer a member state with lump-sum bene…ts. For those planning to always
stay in their home country, investment in education depends on the contribution rate and
bene…ts as when migration is not possible. It remains to characterize investments in case a
citizen plans to migrate, if feasible. The maximization problem of a citizen who would like
to migrate from country A to country B reads as
max
??
µ
¡1
2
?2? + (1¡ ?)(1¡ ?? +
???+1
1 + ?
)(?+ ??) + ?(1¡ ??)(?+ ??) + ??
?
?+1
1 + ?
¶
? (8)
resulting in an optimal investment
e???? = (1¡ ?)(1¡ ?? + ???+1
1 + ?
) + ?(1¡ ??)? (9)
Here tilde is used to denote the choice by a citizen willing to migrate. A potential migrant
from country B to country A optimizes
max
??
µ
¡1
2
?2? + ?(1¡ ?? +
???+1
1 + ?
)(?+ ??) + (1¡ ?)(1¡ ??)(?+ ??) + (1¡ ?)?
?
?+1
1 + ?
¶
? (10)
with the solution e???? = ?(1¡ ?? + ???+1
1 + ?
) + (1¡ ?)(1¡ ??)? (11)
Whatever the ability distribution and the willingness to migrate, it has to hold that ???+1 = ??
in the steady-state. Otherwise, the budget constraint stating that contributions collected
equal bene…ts paid in each period would not be satis…ed. When ???+1 = ??, (3) and (5)
imply that investments in education by those expecting to migrate are a linear combination
of investments chosen in the two countries in the absence of migration, with ? determining
the weights:
e???? = (1¡ ?)???? + ?????? (12)e???? = ????? + (1¡ ?)????? (13)
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Focusing on the steady-state, we …nd that
Proposition 1 With ???+1 = ??, there is migration from country A to country B if and only
if
???+1 ?
1 + ?
2
(???? ¡ ????) [(2¡ ?)???? + ?????]
and from country B to country A if and only if
???+1 ?
1 + ?
2
(???? ¡ ????) [2?+ (2¡ ?)???? + ?????] ?
Proof. In the Appendix.
The …rst (second) condition in Proposition 1 states that a citizen with the lowest (highest)
ability would like to emigrate from the country with earnings-related (‡at-rate) bene…ts when
the expected ‡at-rate bene…t is su¢ciently high (low). A necessary, though not su¢cient,
condition for having migration from country B to A is that ???? ? ????, which is equivalent
to ???
1 + ?
? ??? (14)
This corresponds to a requirement that the e¤ective tax burden caused by the social security
contribution rate has to be higher in the country with ‡at-rate bene…ts. Notice that this
may be the case even when the contribution rate is lower with ‡at-rate system.3 If (14) is
violated, then everyone would prefer to migrate from country A to B. We can also show
Proposition 2 An increase in the probability of international mobility ? decreases (in-
creases) investment in education in country A (B), provided that there is emigration.
Proof. In the Appendix.
We …nd that the possibility of migration tends to stimulate investment in education in the
country with ‡at-rate bene…ts, and depress it in the country with earnings-related bene…ts.
The caveat that the results hold provided that there is emigration results as migration may
go in only one direction, in which case changes in ? would not a¤ect investment in education
in the country with no emigration.
5. Welfare E¤ects of Migration
5.1 E¤ects on steady-state generations
We can separate between two qualitatively di¤erent migration patterns. With population
exchange, a fraction of citizens from either country would prefer to migrate to the other
country. With unilateral migration, only citizens from one country want to emigrate.
Population exchange requires that the high-ability citizens want to migrate from country
B to country A, and low-ability citizens want to migrate from A to B. A necessary condition
3Assuming an annual interest rate of 4.0 percent and that each period consists of 30 years would imply
? = 2?24. (14) is full…lled if ? ? is at least 69 percent of ??. In 2001, public spending on retirement bene…ts
was in average 6.4 percent of GDP in OECD countries with ‡at-rate bene…ts, and 9.4 percent in countries
with earnings-related bene…ts (Disney, 2004; OECD, 2003). That the average ? ? in OECD countries is 68
percent of the average ?? suggests that the condition holds for many but not all country pairs.
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for population exchange is that (14) holds. This implies that citizens invest more in their
education the higher the probability that they would reside in country A. As a result, allowing
for migration resulting in population exchange discourages investment in education among
low-ability people in country A, and encourages it in country B among high-ability people.
The welfare e¤ects on steady-state cohorts are given by
Proposition 3 Migration resulting in population exchange increases the expected utility of
high-ability natives in country B and low-ability natives in country A. The utility of low-
ability natives in country B may change in either direction. The utility of high-ability natives
in country A is left unchanged.
Proof. In the Appendix.
A priori, one could expect that population exchange would always hurt low-ability citi-
zens of the country with ‡at-rate bene…ts. After all, population exchange means an out‡ow
of net contributors, and an in‡ow of those expected to bene…t from income redistribution.
The most surprising …nding of proposition 3 is that the e¤ects of migration on the welfare of
low-ability citizens in country B may go in either direction. They face two con‡icting e¤ects.
The above mentioned e¤ect, an out‡ow of net contributors and an in‡ow of other low-ability
citizens, could be labelled a redistribution e¤ect. It reduces the welfare of low-ability citizens
in country B. However, there is also a human capital e¤ect. The possibility of migration to
a country with earnings-related bene…ts encourages investment in education by high-ability
natives. At the same time, the low-ability immigrants have invested more in human capital
as they also have taken into account the possibility that they would not have become mobile.
This human capital e¤ect may overweight the redistribution e¤ect.
With unilateral migration, we …nd that
Proposition 4 If all citizens want to migrate from B to A, then allowing for migration
improves the steady-state welfare of the initial citizens in B and leaves the steady-state welfare
of the initial citizens in A unchanged.
Proof. When all citizens want to migrate and fraction ? emigrates, the distribution of ?
does not change. By Proposition 2, allowing for migration from B to A increases investment
in education in B. This implies a higher steady-state ?. By revealed preferences, this implies
that the expected utility of all citizens in B increases: each of them could have chosen the
same investment in education as without migration and received a higher bene…t.
5.2 E¤ects on transition generations
The previous section showed that allowing for migration may improve the welfare of
steady-state generations in both countries, even when the two countries have identical pro-
duction technologies. However, an intergenerational Pareto-improvement would also require
that the welfare of the transition generation is improved in both countries, or at least left
unchanged. This section analyzes whether this can be the case. For simplicity, we assume
that the two countries have identical social security contribution rates so that ?? = ?? = ? .
Assume also that ? ? 1
2
as otherwise reducing ? would increase social security tax revenue
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in country B also without migration. Also, assume that the citizens are of identical abilities,
? being normalized to zero. In the absence of migration, ‡at-rate bene…ts are then
?? = ?(1¡ ?)? (15)
We can now calculate the surplus (or de…cit) with promised bene…ts in country A (B)
in period ?, denoted by ???? (????). It is the sum of social security contributions collected
in country A (B) in period ?, deducted by the sum of promised bene…ts to the pensioners
living in country A (B) in period ? if ?? = ? ? (?? = ??).
As shown in the proof of the following proposition, the transition generation of pensioners
in B would lose from allowing migration if there are no transfers between the two countries.
However, the next proposition also shows that there is a transfer program which allows for
an intertemporal Pareto-improvement in both countries with migration, compared with the
situation without migration. To show this, we …rst de…ne:
De…nition 1 Surplus-Sharing Mechanism requires that
(i) if ???? + ???? ¸ 0, then both countries pay their promised bene…ts and any remaining
surplus is distributed to all citizens of A and B as uniform lump-sum transfers;
(ii) if ???? + ???? ? 0 and ???? ¸ 0 then ? pays bene…ts with ?? = ?? and transfers the
surplus to B;
(iii) if ???? + ???? ? 0 and ???? ¸ 0 then ? pays bene…ts with ?? = ?? and transfers the
surplus to A.
Surplus-Sharing Mechanism requires solidarity between the two countries in …nancing
their promised bene…ts to the extent that neither country is required to make transfers
to the point where it would not be able to pay its own promised bene…ts. Any surplus
which is left after both countries have …nanced their promised bene…ts is distributed to all
citizens as lump-sum transfers. This is a rather demanding condition for …nding a Pareto-
improvement: using the surplus to reduce social security contribution rates or to pay sup-
plementary earnings-related bene…ts would result in lower distortions in human capital for-
mation and thus to even higher welfare. However, an intertemporal Pareto-improvement is
possible already with Surplus-Sharing Mechanism:
Proposition 5 With homogeneous population, equal contribution rates, and Surplus-Sharing
Mechanism, both earnings-related and ‡at-rate bene…ts can be paid in both countries with mi-
gration as in the absence of migration. Together, countries A and B have a total surplus of
???? + ???? = ?
2?
1+? in the period of transition and ???? + ???? =
?2?(1¡?)
1+? in the new steady-
state. In the absence of transfers, country A would run a surplus and country B a de…cit in
the transition period. In the new steady-state, country A would have a balanced budget and
country B a surplus.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Notice that Proposition 5 and Surplus-Sharing Mechanism identify only one way of
achieving an intertemporal Pareto-improvement in both countries. As lump-sum trans-
fers are independent of domicile, they do not a¤ect migration decisions or investments in
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education. The …nding that ???? ? 0 in the transition period implies that there is no Pareto-
improvement in the absence of transfers; country B would not be able to pay as high bene…ts
to the pensioners of the transition generation as it would without migration. Intuitively, the
required transfer mechanism re‡ects the role of the PAYG social security as implicit gov-
ernment debt. When migration is allowed, a fraction of current and future human capital
migrates to the country with earnings-related bene…ts. This reduces the current and future
tax base in the country with ‡at-rate bene…ts, as well as the number of bene…ciaries in fu-
ture. However, the current number of bene…ciaries is determined by history. Therefore, the
country with ‡at-rate bene…ts ends up under duress in the …rst period with a common labor
market. This problem can be solved by transferring tax payments of the …rst generation of
migrants.
The policy coordination discussed in this paper is linked to, yet separate, from previous
proposals by Sinn (1994) and Richter (2002). In the Origin Principle suggested by Sinn
(1994), young citizens would have to choose their redistribution system at the young age
without possibility to escape it later. In the framework of this paper, this would be equivalent
to having a probability of being able to change from one system to another equal to one. This
would eliminate the positive human capital e¤ect from increased human capital investments
of those potential migrants staying; everyone who would like to change the system would
choose in the …rst place the social security system of the other country.
In the Principle of Delayed Integration that Richter (2002) proposes, migrants would be
reassigned in the matters of social security and income redistribution from their previous
country to the new country only after a transition period. During the transition period,
they would be subject to the rules of their previous country of residence. There are two
alternative interpretations of this to social security. The …rst one is that migrants would
both make their payments and receive their bene…ts partly from their country of origin, and
partly from the country of destination. The second one is that they would contribute for a
certain time to the system of their country of origin and then make remaining payments and
collect their bene…ts from the country to which they have migrated. The …rst interpretation
of the Principle of Delayed Integration would e¤ectively reduce both gains and losses from
migration, corresponding in its e¤ects to scaling down the probability of mobility. The
second interpretation, on the other hand, could result in qualitatively di¤erent distribution
of welfare gains and losses. Take, for example, the case of identical contribution rates and
abilities analyzed in this subsection. Having migrants from B to A pay a fraction of their
contributions to B, yet receive bene…ts from A, would introduce a permanent ‡ow of funds
from A to B. After the transition period, this would require country A to scale down its
replacement rate. Therefore, the transfer system suggested in this paper could allow for
an intertemporal Pareto-improvement, even if a permanent system of Delayed Integration
would not.
6. Conclusion
This paper derived some expected and some rather surprising results on the e¤ects of
allowing migration between countries with di¤erent social security systems. As expected,
there is some cuto¤ productivity level above which citizens prefer earnings-related systems,
and below which they would rather have ‡at bene…ts. This cuto¤ level may also be associated
10
with a corner solution, with all citizens preferring one of the competing systems. Also, it
turned out that the possibility of migration from a ‡at-rate system to an earnings-related
system stimulates human capital formation. Conversely, those willing to migrate to a country
with ‡at-rate bene…ts may reduce their investment in education.
Allowing for free migration may, but need not, pose problems for either system. Perhaps
the most surprising result is that allowing for migration could generate an intertemporal
Pareto-improvement even in the absence of any productivity di¤erences between the two
countries, unilateral migration and the two countries having identical social security con-
tribution rates. This requires transfers between the countries. If the two countries share
the surplus left when they both pay bene…ts as without migration, then the transfers go in
opposite directions in the transition period and in the new steady-state. In the transition
period, the …rst cohort of migrants from the country with ‡at-rate bene…ts pays part of their
social security contributions to their country of origin, even if they receive bene…ts from their
new home country. In subsequent periods, the country with ‡at-rate bene…ts can transfer
resources to the country with earnings-related bene…ts in return, and still have its citizens
reach a higher expected utility. This e¤ect would not arise in the absence of endogenous
human capital formation, highlighting the importance of taking into account investments in
education when analyzing the welfare e¤ects of labor market integration.
Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
The presence of migration requires that two conditions are satis…ed: First, those migrat-
ing have to be willing to migrate ex post. Second, those willing to migrate have to reach ex
ante a higher expected utility with the strategy in which they invest in education expecting
to be willing to migrate than by investing as they would when not expecting to migrate. The
…rst condition is implied by the second one, as there is no uncertainly related to whether
migration is attractive after the individual’s own mobility status is revealed. To analyze the
second condition, we have to solve for the expected utility of those most likely to migrate.
They are citizens with ? = 0 in country A and citizens with ? = ? in B. Inserting (3),
???+1 = ??, and ? = 0 into (2) gives as the utility of those with ? = 0 and not planning to
migrate 1
2
?2???. Inserting ???+1 = ??, (3), (5), and (12) into (8), we …nd that the utility of
those citizens with ? = 0 and wishing to migrate from A to B is
1
2
[(1¡ ?)???? + ?????]2 + ??
?
?+1
1 + ?
?
The latter is larger if and only if
???+1 ?
1 + ?
2
(???? ¡ ????) [(2¡ ?)???? + ?????] ? (A.1)
The utility of citizens with ? = ? and not planning to emigrate from B is found by
inserting (5) into (4)
?????+
1
2
?2??? +
???+1
1 + ?
?
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The utility of those high-ability natives planning to emigrate from B is found by inserting
???+1 = ??, (3), (5), and (13) into (10), giving
[????? + (1¡ ?)????] ?+ 1
2
[????? + (1¡ ?)????]2 + (1¡ ?)?
?
?+1
1 + ?
?
The latter is higher if
???+1 ?
1 + ?
2
(???? ¡ ????) [2?+ (2¡ ?)???? + ?????] ? (A.2)
Proof of Proposition 2.
Notice …rst that as the change in ? is a shock revealed at the beginning of a period, the
probability of being mobile is the same for current and all future generations. This implies
that the value of the retirement bene…ts in a ‡at-rate system and replacement rate in an
earnings-related system that the current young generation expects to face are the same as
that which will be faced by subsequent generations. Denote the period of the shock by ?.
Then, ???+1 = ???+1+? and ???+1 = ???+1+? 8? 2 N. In the country with ‡at-rate bene…ts, it also
holds that ?? = ???+1 as investment in education and migration decisions reach their steady-
state values immediately. In the country with earnings-dependent bene…ts, it need not be
that ?? would equal ???+1. The reason for this asymmetry is that ?? depends on investments
in education made in the previous period. By (9) and ???+1 = ??, ???? ??? ? 0 and by (11)
and ???+1 = ??, ???? ??? ? 0, for those willing to migrate. Notice that those not planning
to migrate do not change their investments. The ability thresholds between those planning
and those not planning to migrate may change. The threshold change strengthens the e¤ect
arising from changed investments by those planning to migrate both before and after the
change in ?.
Proof of Proposition 3.
In any steady-state equilibrium, ?? = ??. Therefore, the welfare of high-ability natives
residing in country A does not change as a result of allowing migration. If high-ability
natives from B want to emigrate to A, then their expected utility must increase by revealed
preferences. Similarly, note that when low-ability natives from A want to emigrate to B,
then their expected utility must increase by revealed preferences.
To prove that the welfare of low-ability natives living in B may change in either direction,
simplify the analysis by assuming that there are two ability types, ? and ?. The innate ability
of type ? is zero, and that of type ? ??. The share of type ? is ?. If there is no migration,
???? = 1¡ ???
1 + ?
and
???? = 1¡ ?? ?
Furthermore,
?? = ?? (??? + 1¡ ??) ?
resulting in utility for low-ability citizens of
(1¡ ??)2
2
+
??
1 + ?
(??? + 1¡ ??) ?
12
With migration, the low-ability natives in country A choose, provided that they are going
to migrate if mobile, e???? = (1¡ ?)(1¡ ???
1 + ?
) + ?(1¡ ??)
and the high-ability natives in country B choose, provided that they are going to migrate if
mobile, e???? = ?(1¡ ???
1 + ?
) + (1¡ ?)(1¡ ??)?
In an equilibrium with population exchange,
(1 + ?¡ 2??)?? = ??(1¡ ?)(1¡ ??)
+??(1¡ ?)?
£
?? + ?(1¡ ???1+? ) + (1¡ ?)(1¡ ??)
¤
+???(1¡ ?)
£
(1¡ ?)(1¡ ???
1+? ) + ?(1¡ ??)
¤
?
(A.3)
The left-hand side gives total social security expenditures. Total population of the retirees
consists of 1¡ ? low-ability natives, ?(1¡ ?) high-ability natives who remained and ?(1¡ ?)
low-ability immigrants. The …rst term on the right-hand side of (A.3) is the revenue from
the low-ability natives who all stay, the second term is the tax revenue from the high-ability
natives who stay and the third term is the tax revenue from low-ability citizens who migrate
from A.
We can next calculate the utilities of high and low-ability natives in a closed economy
and in a common labor market, subject to their plans on whether to migrate. Assume that
?? = 0?2, ? = 0?2, ?? = ?? = 0?2 and ? = 1. Then allowing for migration with ? = 0?2
results in population exchange, increasing the utility of low-ability natives also in country B.
Assume next otherwise identical parameter values, but ?? = 0?3. Now allowing for migration
causes low-ability natives in country B to lose.
Proof of Proposition 5.
When ???+1 = ? (1¡ ? ) and ???+1 = ? , Proposition 1 implies that all citizens would prefer
to migrate from B to A and none from A to B. (To see this, insert …rst ? = 0, (3), (5),
?? = ?? = ? , and (15) into (A.1) and (A.2).) Both in the transition period and in the new
steady state, e?? = 1¡ ? + ??
1 + ?
?
The social security tax revenue in both the transition period and in following periods is
given in country A by
??? = ? (1¡ ??
1 + ?
) + ??(1¡ ? + ??
1 + ?
)?
where the …rst term is the tax revenue from natives and the second term the tax revenue
from immigrants. In country B, the social security tax revenue in both the transition period
and in following periods is given by
??? = ? (1¡ ?)(1¡ ? + ??
1 + ?
)?
The total cost of promised social security bene…ts is in the transition period in country A
???? = ? (1¡
??
1 + ?
)
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and in country B
???? = ? (1¡ ? )?
The total cost of promised social security bene…ts is in the new steady-state in country A
???? = ? (1¡
??
1 + ?
) + ??(1¡ ? + ??
1 + ?
)
and in country B
???? = (1¡ ?)?(1¡ ?)?
Taking into account the assumption ? ? 1
2
, the results follow as ???? = ??? ¡ ???? and
???? = ??? ¡ ???? in the transition period and ???? = ???¡ ???? and ???? = ??? ¡ ????
in the new steady-state.
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